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AN HIV ADVOCATE’S VIEW OF FAMILY COURT:
LESSONS FROM A BROKEN SYSTEM
LAUREN SHAPIRO*
I.  INTRODUCTION
Around the time I began working with HIV-positive clients,1 a discussion
was brewing about the potential for HIV-based discrimination in child custody
and visitation cases.  Several courts recently had evaluated the role of a parent’s
HIV status in custody and visitation cases and had held that HIV should not be
the sole basis for a custody or visitation determination.2  A number of law review
articles also had been written on the topic3 reviewing existing case law that had
held that it is impermissible for a court to rely on a parent’s disability as prima
facie evidence of parental unfitness or harm to the child.4  One article called upon
courts to refrain from following a per se rule that a parent is unfit on the basis of
HIV alone and to ensure that the paramount concern is the child’s welfare.5  Af-
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1. In 1989, South Brooklyn Legal Services founded the HIV Project (“the Project”), one of the
first programs in the country dedicated to providing HIV-specific legal services to the low income
community.  The author founded the project and was the director until October 1996.
2. See, e.g., Stewart v. Stewart, 521 N.E.2d 956, 965 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (reversing the lower
court’s determination, which had found that a father’s HIV infection was a sufficient reason to deny
visits, as “extreme and unwarranted”); Anne D. v. Raymond D., 528 N.Y.S.2d 775 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1988) (denying a motion for involuntary HIV testing on grounds that an unsubstantiated allegation
of extra-marital affairs is not sufficiently egregious under equitable distribution to constitute an ex-
ception to the discovery role); Doe v. Roe, 526 N.Y.S.2d 718 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988) (denying motion for
involuntary HIV testing of a father on the grounds that the plaintiffs failed to show compelling need
for disclosure and because the father’s HIV status would not determine visitation rights); Jane W. v.
John W., 519 N.Y.S.2d 603 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987) (granting a father’s motion for visitation even though
he had AIDS because he was able to care for the child).
3. See, e.g., Aline Cole Barrett & Michelle Flint, The Effect of AIDS on Child Custody Determina-
tions, 23 GONZ. L. REV. 167 (1987); Amy R. Pearce, Visitation Rights of an AIDS Infected Parent, 27 J.
FAM. L. 715 (1988); Nancy B. Mahon, Note, Public Hysteria, Private Conflict: Child Custody and Visita-
tion Disputes Involving an HIV Infected Parent, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1092 (1988).
4. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Carney, 598 P.2d 36, 42 (Cal. App.1979) (holding that denial of
custody on the basis of a parent’s disability went against public policy embodied in state law pro-
tecting the disabled).  For additional cases following Carney, see JOHN P. MCCAHEY ET AL., CHILD
CUSTODY VISITATION LAW AND PRACTICE  §§ 10-2[01]-10-2[11] (1997); Mahon, supra note 3, at 1125-28.
5. See Mahon, supra note 3, at 1138-41.
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ter reviewing these cases and articles, I felt optimistic about representing HIV-
positive parents in Family Court—until I entered the court room.
Denise,6 the first HIV-positive woman I represented in Family Court, came
to my office trying to regain custody of her daughter, Michelle, who was thirteen
years old.  While Denise had been hospitalized for many months with severe
pneumonia, her daughter had been living with her paternal grandmother.
Denise also had suffered from a psychotic episode due to HIV-related dementia,7
which now was under control.  It took Denise several months after being dis-
charged from the hospital to regain the strength to get her daughter back.  Un-
fortunately, the grandmother then refused to return Michelle to Denise and was
allowing Denise to see her only a few hours a week.
We immediately filed a custody proceeding against the paternal grand-
mother.  I felt  confident about the merits of Denise’s case, as biological parents
have the presumptive right to custody of their children over non-parents.8  We
also had compelling facts on our side.  Denise’s HIV illness, although advanced,
did not interfere with her ability to care for her daughter.  She had a case man-
ager and a home attendant twelve hours a day, and she was entitled to
“homemaking” services.9  Denise was seeing a therapist weekly to help her cope
with her illness.  She lived in the same apartment building as her sister, who had
children of her own and was very involved in Denise’s care.  Denise’s sister came
to every court date, and reiterated her willingness to help care for Michelle.
I was sure these facts would help Denise in court; instead, they were used
against her.  The fact that she had a home attendant, case manager, and therapist
were relied on by the opposing counsel as proof that she was too sick to care for
her daughter.  The reality that Denise was becoming increasingly ill meant that
Michelle should be kept away from, and not permitted to spend more time with,
her mother.  When I argued in court that no judge would remove a child from a
mother dying of cancer, the judge told me that AIDS is not like cancer.  The
judge ordered mental health examinations of the parties, which is a common
court practice before making a final determination.  The judge, however, refused
to increase visitation before these exams were completed, even though Denise
was visiting her daughter for only a couple of hours each week.  I represented
6. The first name of the client has been changed to protect her and her family’s confidentiality.
Each of the clients discussed in this Article are clients who were represented by South Brooklyn Le-
gal Service’s HIV Project.
7. AIDS dementia is believed to be caused by HIV attacking the brain and usually occurs at
later stages of illness, causing changes in a person’s mental ability, attitude, and muscle control.  See
JOHN G. BARTLETT ET AL., LIVING WITH HIV INFECTION 154 (1991).
8. The majority of jurisdictions employ the “parental preference” standard in evaluating the
claims of non-parents against parents.  See MCCAHEY ET AL., supra note 4, § 11.3-4.  A biological par-
ent has a right to custody of the children over all other parties except in “extraordinary circumstanc-
es,” such as abandonment, unfitness, persistent neglect, or extended disruption of custody.  See Ben-
nett v. Jeffries, 356 N.E.2d 277, 280 (N.Y. 1970); see also Petition of Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181 (Ill. 1994);
Stuhr v. Stuhr, 481 N.W.2d 212 (Neb. 1992).
9. A “homemaker” helps a parent care for the child.  HIV-infected parents are eligible for pre-
ventive services if their condition impairs their ability to care for their children and places the chil-
dren at risk of foster care placement.  See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 430.9(c)(4) (1997).
Preventive services include homemaking services.  See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, §§ 423.2,
.4 (1997).
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Denise in court for almost a year.  The stress of the ongoing court proceeding
and the constant setbacks we encountered were more than she could bear.  She
began to give up and stopped taking care of herself; her health deteriorated
gradually.  Before her death, she and her daughter never visited for more than a
couple of hours each week.
Years later, I have a better understanding of the factors at work in Denise’s
case.  The judicial response we witnessed was more than a fear of illness and
death.  It also reflected the judge’s belief that she somehow could protect Mi-
chelle from these certainties.  The judge also was struggling with an arduous
task—how to evaluate the impact of a parent’s fluctuating and unpredictable ill-
ness on a child.  I have learned that many of the obstacles we faced are very
much a part of the Family Court process in New York City.  The judge’s reluc-
tance to deal with an emotionally-charged issue, her failure to examine the facts
of the case in light of the appropriate legal standard, and the endless delays are
all endemic to the system.  These factors are the product of a court handling an
extremely high volume of cases in overcrowded and stressful conditions.  The
Family Court is burdened further because it handles cases primarily of poor
people who have few resources and many needs.10  These elements create enor-
mous barriers to HIV-positive litigants seeking resolution of their disputes.
Since representing Denise, I have advocated for hundreds of HIV-positive
parents in Family Court.  Most of these clients were women of color, and all of
them were poor.  Since then, several additional Family Court decisions have held
that HIV should not be the sole basis for custody or visitation determinations.11
While these cases are helpful, they do little to alleviate the real obstacles that HIV
litigants face in the courtroom.  In reviewing the published court decisions con-
cerning HIV and parental relationships,12 there is a great disparity between what
the law says and what often occurs in the courtroom.  There are powerful fears
and assumptions at work in court that obliterate the effectiveness of laws pro-
hibiting discrimination on the basis of disability.  Fears include exposing chil-
dren to illness and death, as well as intense prejudice against both individuals
10. See THE FUND FOR MODERN COURTS, THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY OF NEW YORK CITY
FAMILY COURT: A CITIZEN COURT MONITORS’ ASSESSMENT OF THE COURT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR IMPROVEMENT 1 (1997) [hereinafter THE FUND FOR MODERN COURTS].
11. See, e.g., Newton v. Riley, 899 S.W.2d 509 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995) (upholding the lower court’s
denial of a motion to modify custody order based on mother living with HIV-positive husband);
Sherman v. Sherman, No. 01-A-01-9304-CH00188, 1994 WL 649148  (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 18, 1994)
(upholding the lower court’s denial of a mother’s motion to restrict visits of a father who lived with
an HIV-positive brother, and overturning the lower court’s decision that required the father to sub-
mit to periodic HIV testing and that restricted his children from sleeping in his home); Steven L. v.
Dawn J., 561 N.Y.S.2d 322 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1990) (denying a motion to modify a custody order on the
grounds that HIV status is not a “material change in circumstances”); see also DSCYF/DFS v. Bryant,
No. 95-08-07T, 1996 WL 436439 (Del. Fam. Ct. May 30, 1996) (holding that a mother and child’s HIV
status do not justify termination of parental rights).  But cf. H.J.B. v. P.W., 628 So. 2d 753 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1993) (upholding the lower court’s ruling that an HIV-positive father’s health and lifestyle,
coupled with two recent moves, constituted a material changed circumstance warranting a change
in custody).
12. See supra notes 2 and 11.
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with substance abuse histories and those who are gay or lesbian.13  Most legal
scholarship on HIV and custody determinations is based primarily on reported
cases.  Since most Family Court cases do not result in written decisions, the re-
ported cases are not an accurate indicator of how custody disputes actually are
resolved.  Moreover, neither the published cases nor the law review articles con-
sider HIV-related issues in court cases that involve foster care.14  In this setting,
the prejudices and assumptions about HIV, poverty, and substance abuse are
even more powerful, and, as a result, parents and their children often are treated
unfairly.
This Article examines the difficulties that HIV-positive litigants, most of
whom are poor women of color, face in the court process, how laws prohibiting
HIV-related discrimination fail to help them, and how the court process often
obstructs their relationships with their children.  Part II discusses the demo-
graphics of the current HIV epidemic and the impact of these changed demo-
graphics on HIV-related custody determinations.  The significance of the in-
creasing impact of the epidemic on women and children is highlighted because
women tend to be the caretakers of children when the children are raised by a
single parent.15  Part III examines the laws prohibiting disability-based discrimi-
nation.  Part IV looks briefly at the cases that address disability in the context of
custody and visitation determinations and focuses on cases involving an HIV-
infected parent.  Part V explores the barriers that HIV-infected parents face in
the Family Court process in New York.  Part VI discusses how a court’s consid-
eration of seemingly neutral factors often results in discriminatory rulings.  Part
VII considers the improvements in the health status of people with HIV in the
context of HIV-related custody cases, and Part VIII concludes by making recom-
mendations for HIV legal advocates in light of these health advances.
13. The stigma associated with HIV is based on the perception that those most affected by the
disease are gay men and individuals with a history of intravenous drug use.  Since this Article de-
rives from the author’s experience as a practitioner, it addresses only discrimination against indi-
viduals with substance abuse histories.  Although some of the author’s clients were gay or lesbian,
this fact rarely was raised in court.  While this Article does not explore this issue in detail, there is a
strong connection between HIV-related discrimination and prejudice against gays and lesbians.  In
fact, in the reported decisions, prejudices against individuals based on their sexual orientation or
their substance use histories is much more candid and vociferous than is the articulated discrimina-
tion based on HIV status.  See Taunya Lovell Bank, Reproduction and Parenting, in AIDS LAW TODAY:
A NEW GUIDE FOR THE PUBLIC 216, 229 (Scott Burris et al. eds., 1993) (discussing the influence drug
use has in labeling a mother  a “bad mother,” a sentiment that often is reflected in judicial decisions
about custody); Donna I. Dennis, HIV Screening & Discrimination: The Federal Example, in AIDS LAW
TODAY, supra, at 187, 206-08 (reporting that discrimination against gay people has influenced federal
court decisions in a variety of arenas).
14. There is only one reported case examining HIV in the context of foster care.  See John T. v.
Carraher, 538 N.W.2d 761, 772-73 (Neb. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the Department of Social Serv-
ices could not remove a child from his foster home because his foster mother was HIV-positive).  As
of January 1998, there are no reported cases discussing the HIV status of a biological parent seeking
the return of a child from foster care.
15. The HIV Project, however, assists many HIV-infected fathers seeking custody or visitation
of their children in Family Court, many of whom have overcome histories of substance abuse.
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II.  OVERVIEW OF HIV AND FAMILY LAW ISSUES
The HIV epidemic has shifted dramatically in the past ten years as a result
of the marked increase in HIV infection rates among women, people of color,
and IV drug users.  Women now represent almost one-fifth of the AIDS cases in
the United States,16 a proportion that has doubled since 1990.17  AIDS is the third
leading cause of death for women between twenty-five and forty-four years of
age, and is the leading cause of death for African-American women between the
ages of fifteen and forty-four.18
The borough of Brooklyn has the highest concentration of women with HIV
infection in New York City; as of March 1997, 6335 women in Brooklyn had been
diagnosed with AIDS, more than one-third of the total number of women diag-
nosed in New York City.19  The HIV Project at South Brooklyn Legal Services
(“the Project”) represents almost 1000 people each year who reflect the cultural
diversity of Brooklyn.  The majority of the clients are women who come from
many different ethnic backgrounds, including Latinas, African-Americans, re-
cent African immigrants, Haitians, and other Caribbean-Americans.
In examining the impact of the shifting HIV epidemic on families, the pow-
erful relationship between HIV and drug use cannot be ignored.20  Intravenous
(“IV”) drug use, through the sharing of infected or “dirty” needles, is one of the
primary modes of HIV transmission; nationwide, more than one-third of all di-
agnosed AIDS cases are related to injection drug use.21  Many women who do not
use drugs themselves contract HIV through sexual contact with an IV drug
user.22  In addition, many HIV-positive women who contracted HIV hetero-
16. See Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Update:
Trends in AIDS Incidence—United States, 1996, 46 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 861, 865 tbl.3
(1997) (noting that women account for 44,440 of the 235,470 people living with AIDS in the United
States).
17. In 1990, less than one-tenth of the reported adult AIDS cases were women.  See Tedd V.
Ellerbrock et al., Epidemiology of Women with AIDS in the United States, 1981 through 1990, 265 JAMA
2972 (1991).
18. See Leslie Hanna, Recent News About Women & HIV, BETA, Mar. 1997, at 18, 18.
19. See NEW YORK CITY DEP’T OF HEALTH, AIDS NEW YORK CITY, AIDS SURVEILLANCE UPDATE:
FIRST QUARTER 1997 12 tbl.16 (1997) [hereinafter AIDS SURVEILLANCE UPDATE—NEW YORK CITY].
The number of women who are HIV-infected is much larger.  See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NO. 2, HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REPORT 5, 35
tbl.27 (1996).  HIV infection data is not kept presently by New York or the Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention, except for the 29 states that require HIV case surveillance of adults and chil-
dren.  See id. at 35 tbl.27; see also CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (CDC) & COUNCIL OF
STATE AND TERRITORIAL EPIDEMIOLOGISTS (CSTE), CONSULTATION ON THE FUTURE OF HIV/AIDS
SURVEILLANCE, Attachment III (1997) (on file with the Duke Journal of Gender Law & Policy).
20. See J. F. Havens et al., Mental Health Issues in HIV-Affected Women and Children, 8 INT’L REV.
PSYCHIATRY 217, 217-25 (1996) (discussing the prevalence of HIV illness in families struggling with
substance abuse); Ann B. Williams & Patrick G. O’Connor, Substance Abuse Issues, in PRIMARY CARE
OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN WITH HIV INFECTION: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 217, 217-38
(Patricia Kelly et al. eds., 1995).
21. See Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, supra note 16, at 865 tbl.3.
22. See Havens et al., supra note 20, at 217-18.
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sexually also have current or past histories of crack or other substance abuse.23
The impact of substance abuse on family relationships is profound,24 and is at the
heart of many of the custody and visitation disputes described in this Article.
As a result of this expanding HIV epidemic, more children and family rela-
tionships have been affected than could have been imagined fifteen years ago.25
Not only are the numbers of HIV-infected women rising, but seventy percent of
these women are in their reproductive years.26  At least one study has attempted
to demonstrate the profound impact on families by projecting the number of
children who may be orphaned by AIDS;27 it has been estimated that between
72,000 and 125,000 children will lose their mothers to AIDS by the year 2000.28  In
New York City, the number of children expected to be orphaned as a result of
AIDS is expected to reach between 29,000 and 34,000 by the year 2000.29
The increasing number of HIV-positive women with children, the connec-
tion between HIV transmission and drug abuse, and the powerful role of Family
Court and child welfare agencies in the lives of poor people have all led to the
increased presence of HIV-related issues, either directly or indirectly, in the
context of custody and foster-care cases.  Since the mid-1980s there have been
numerous articles published addressing these issues,30 and legal services offices
in high incidence areas, like Brooklyn, have been inundated with requests for
representation by HIV-positive individuals.
This Article focuses on the types of cases most prevalent in the Project’s
practice, including custody, guardianship, visitation, and foster care cases, which
are litigated primarily in Family Court.  New York State Family Court was cre-
23. See Williams & O’Connor, supra note 20, at 218; cf. Brian R. Edlin, Intersecting Epidemics—
Crack Cocaine Use and HIV Infection Among Inner-City Young Adults, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1422, 1425-
27 (1994) (finding that poor urban youths who smoke crack cocaine are at high risk for contracting
HIV).
24. See Havens et al., supra note 20, at 218-19.
25. See generally David Michaels & Carol Levine, The Youngest Survivors: Estimates of the Number
of Motherless Youth Orphaned by AIDS in New York City, in A DEATH IN THE FAMILY: ORPHANS OF THE
HIV EPIDEMIC 3, 3-12 (Carol Levine ed., 1993) (finding that American children increasingly are being
orphaned by the epidemic); Wendy Nehring, Family and Living Issues for HIV-Infected Children, in
WOMEN, CHILDREN, & HIV/AIDS 211, 211-27 (Felissa L. Cohen & Jerry D. Durham eds., 1993).
26. See COMMISSION ON WOMEN’S HEALTH, SELECTED FACTS ON U.S. WOMEN’S HEALTH: A
CHARTBOOK 22, 27 (Mar. 1997).
27. See Michaels & Levine, supra note 25, at 6-11.
28. See id. at 9.
29. See id.  In New York City, 9300 children were orphaned as a result of AIDS through 1992,
and it is estimated that 30,000 will be orphaned by 2000.  See id. at 6.
30. See Lenette Azzi-Lessing & Lenore J. Olsen, Substance Abuse—Affected Families in the Child
Welfare System: New Challenges, New Alliances, 41 SOCIAL WORK 15, 17 (1996); Elizabeth B. Cooper,
HIV-Infected Parents and the Law: Issues of Custody, Visitation and Guardianship, in AIDS AGENDA:
EMERGING ISSUES IN CIVIL RIGHTS 69, 69-117 (Nan D. Hunter & William B. Rubenstein eds., 1992)
(discussing the challenges HIV-positive parents face with respect to custody, visitation, and plan-
ning for their children); Abigail English, The HIV-AIDS Epidemic and the Child Welfare System: Pro-
tecting the Rights of Infants, Young Children, and Adolescents, 77 IOWA L. REV. 1509, 1509-60 (1992)
(examining discrimination issues in child welfare context for children and adolescents with HIV in-
fection); Robert D. Zaslow, Child Custody, Visitation, and the HIV Virus: Revisiting the Best Interests
Doctrine to Ensure Impartial Parental Rights Determinations for HIV-Infected Parents, 3 J. PHARMACY & L.
58 (1994) (offering an historical view of child custody law and the impact that a parent’s HIV status
has on custody decisions made by courts).
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ated to integrate the handling of the most pressing family problems.  The court
has jurisdiction over, inter alia, the following proceedings: child custody and
visitation, child protection, family offense (domestic violence), juvenile delin-
quency, paternity, and child support.  In 1996, there were 228,921 cases filed in
Family Court in New York City alone.31
The majority of the reported cases involving HIV concern custody disputes
between two parents.32  The legal standard that governs these disputes is the
“best interests of the child” standard,33 under which the judge weighs a variety of
factors to determine which outcome is in the child’s best interests.34  The Project’s
general policy is to decline representation of a parent in a custody dispute
against another parent.35  One exception to this policy is a case in which a party’s
HIV infection is raised by the opposing party as a basis for custody or denial of
visitation.  In such cases, the Project’s HIV-related expertise and affiliations with
HIV social service agencies can make a difference by ensuring that the court has
the appropriate information about HIV and that the client has access to needed
services.  The Project also is more likely to take the case of a parent where the
parent has had custody for a long period of time and HIV is the primary moti-
vation for the other parent to seek a change of custody.
As a result of the policy against representing parents against parents, the
Project generally represents parents against non-parents in custody cases.  In
these cases, the court is supposed to use a standard favoring the parent.36  The
31. See Joe Sexton, Opening the Doors on Family Court’s Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1997, at A1.
32. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
33. In general, custody disputes between two parents involve the “best interests” standard.  See
MCCAHEY ET AL., supra note 4, § 10.02.  When a parent seeks to change a custody determination,
most states place the burden upon the parent seeking to change custody to show that there has been
a material change of circumstances that affects the best interests of the child.  See Mahon, supra note
3, at 1116.  In Steven L. v. Dawn J., the court found that to modify custody, the movant must show
that the mother’s HIV status “poses a danger to the child.”  561 N.Y.S.2d 322, 324 (N.Y. Fam. Ct.
1990).  This Article will not describe in detail the legal standards used in custody and visitation dis-
putes since they are described elsewhere.  See Mahon, supra note 3, at 1109-20 (summarizing the le-
gal standards for original custody and visitation decrees, as well as for the modifications of these
orders); Barrett & Flint, supra note 3, at 171-74.
34. Every jurisdiction provides some statutory directive about which factors courts should con-
sider in disputed custody cases.  See MCCAHEY ET AL., supra note 4, § 10.02.  The Uniform Marriage
and Divorce Act identifies several factors for courts to consider: 1) the wishes of the parents; 2) the
wishes of the child; 3) the relationship between the child and his or her parent or parents, siblings,
and any other person who may significantly affect the child’s best interest; 4) the child’s adjustment
to home, school, and community; and 5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
See Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act § 402, 9A U.L.A. 561 (1987).
35. The rationale for declining representation in cases involving a parent against another parent
is that each parent has equal rights to the child.  These cases leave the most room for discretion and
require extensive litigation involving a wide range of factors.  Like most Legal Services offices, the
HIV Project has extremely limited resources and rarely can meet the demand for services.  See
Charles R. Coregs, Who will Offer Legal Services to County’s Poor?, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 30, 1996, at
19A; Legal Services Survives, Barely, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1996, at A14; Kathy Rohatson, Legal Aid Feels
Pain of Budget Cuts, BUS. J., Apr. 8, 1996, at 19.  As a result of inadequate resources, these offices are
forced to make very difficult choices about whom to represent.
36. See Mahon, supra note 3, at 1116-19.  As this Article explains, however, the appropriate legal
standard in a particular case often makes little difference in the outcome of the case.  See discussion
infra Part V.
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Project also represents many HIV-positive parents against parents or other cus-
todians seeking visitation rights with their children.37
The Project’s representation in foster care cases usually involves helping a
parent who is seeking the return of a child from foster care.  The Project either
will defend the parent against the city’s petition to extend foster care placement
or will file a petition to terminate placement.  The Project also helps parents ob-
tain increased visitation while their children are in foster care.  More rarely, the
Project helps clients to defend petitions to terminate their parental rights, or to
vacate orders terminating, or agreements surrendering, parental rights.  The
Project also assists clients in custody planning.38  Although this Article will not
discuss custody planning in detail, developing a plan for the future of the chil-
dren is very much a part of each Family Court case.
III.  USING DISABILITY ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW IN FAMILY COURT
The paramount challenge in Family Court is to ensure that judges do not act
on the basis of presumption or bias, but rather make decisions based upon the
appropriate facts.  The public policy behind disability anti-discrimination laws
can aid attorneys in educating judges about the importance of making decisions
based on individual assessments instead of on general assumptions about dis-
abilities.  This Part does not try to argue that Family Court judges are bound by
these laws.  Rather, these laws should serve as the underpinning for evolving le-
gal standards concerning HIV-related custody disputes.  As this Part concludes,
the use of anti-discrimination law in Family Court is circumscribed by estab-
lished legal standards that exist in family law,39 and because anti-discrimination
laws were not intended for use in Family Court.40  Even in the face of these limi-
tations, however, these laws serve as important tools for lawyers to confront bi-
ases based on disability in Family Court.
Since the beginning of the HIV epidemic in the early 1980s, HIV-infected
persons have suffered from discrimination because of the stigma associated with
HIV.41  In an effort to fight such discrimination, HIV-infected individuals and
37. A non-custodial parent is entitled to reasonable visitation rights unless a court finds that
visitation would seriously endanger the child’s physical, mental, moral, or emotional health.  See
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act § 407, 9A U.L.A. 612 (1987).
38. Permanency planning programs help parents to consider their available options, discuss
plans with family members, record their decisions in legal documents, and do everything possible to
ensure that the plans are implemented after their death or incapacity.  See Cooper, supra note 30, at
81-95.
39. See supra notes 8, 33, and 37 and accompanying text.
40. For an overview of disability-based discrimination laws, see Arthur S. Leonard, Discrimina-
tion, in AIDS LAW TODAY, supra note 13, at 297, 297-318 (Scott Burris et al. eds., 1993).  As discussed
in this Part, federal and state anti-discrimination laws were designed to combat discrimination in
employment, housing, and public accommodations, and by public entities.
41. Because of the stigma associated with HIV, some states, including New York, have passed
statutes providing for strong confidentiality protections of HIV-related information.  See, e.g., N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2782 (McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1997-1998); see also Sallie Perryman, Family Con-
cerns About Confidentiality and Disclosure, in A DEATH IN THE FAMILY, supra note 25, at 69, 70, 73
(“Conflicts still exist between the benefits of disclosure and the potential for stigma and discrimina-
tion.”).
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their advocates have long relied on federal42 and state laws43 prohibiting dis-
crimination on the basis of an individual’s disability.44  These anti-discrimination
laws have served as powerful tools in achieving equal access to education,45 em-
ployment,46 health care,47 and housing48 for people with HIV.  Likewise, advo-
cates for HIV-positive parents should use these laws as tools for fighting HIV-
related discrimination in Family Court.
Prior to the enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(“ADA”),49 the principle federal law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
disability was the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Rehabilitation Act”).50  The Reha-
bilitation Act prohibits discrimination by any entity receiving federal funds, in-
cluding most state and local government agencies.51  Although the Rehabilitation
Act is limited in scope to federally-funded entities, at least one decision has re-
lied on the Rehabilitation Act to uphold an HIV-positive parent’s right to cus-
tody or visitation with their children. 52  Other courts have held that the Rehabili-
42. See, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994); Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994).
43. All states have statutes with anti-discrimination protections for people with disabilities.  See,
e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 98 (1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168A (1995).  For a national overview
of HIV-related discrimination and the statutes that protect against such discrimination, see NAN D.
HUNTER, ACLU AIDS PROJECT, EPIDEMIC OF FEAR: A SURVEY OF AIDS DISCRIMINATION IN THE 1980S
AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE 1990S 83-133 (1990) [hereinafter ACLU AIDS PROJECT].
44. The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) defines disability broadly as “impairment
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities . . . a record of such impairment, or
being regarded as having such an impairment.”  42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).
45. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.31 (1973) (stating that § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act “applies to pre-
school, elementary, secondary, and adult education programs and activities that receive or benefit
from Federal financial assistance.”); see also Lynn E. Sudbeck, Students with AIDS: Protecting an In-
fected Child’s Right to a Classroom Education and Developing a School’s AIDS Policy, 40 S.D. L. REV. 72,
74 (1995) (examining statutes protecting students with AIDS, the treatment of school children with
AIDS in the courts, and the response of medicine to AIDS in educational environments); see generally
DAVID L. KIRP ET AL., LEARNING BY HEART: AIDS AND SCHOOLCHILDREN IN AMERICA’S COMMUNITIES
1-301 (1989) (relating and discussing the challenges faced by school children with AIDS and their
specific communities).
46. See generally Chai R. Feldblum, Workplace Issues: HIV and Discrimination, in AIDS AGENDA,
supra note 30, at 271, 271-300.
47. See Mark Jackson & Nan D. Hunter, “The Very Fabric of Health Care”: The Duty of Health Care
Providers to Treat People Infected with HIV, in AIDS AGENDA, supra note 30, at 123, 128-38; Lawrence
O. Gostin, Public Health Powers: The Imminence of Radical Change, 69 MILBANK Q. 268, 270 (Supp.
1991).
48. The Federal Fair Housing Amendments of 1988 address housing discrimination against per-
sons with disabilities.  See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1994); see, e.g., Baxter v. City of Belleville, 720 F. Supp.
720, 734-35 (S.D. Ill. 1989) (granting an injunction under the Fair Housing Act to compel an issuance
of use permit to allow a former office building to be remodeled for persons with AIDS).
49. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
50. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994).
51. See id.
52. See Doe v. Roe, 526 N.Y.S.2d 718, 726 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988) (denying maternal grandparents’
motion to compel a father to test for HIV, because, in part, the children would not be in danger of
contracting HIV from living with the father if he were HIV-positive).  The court’s holding relied on
cases prohibiting school authorities from excluding children with AIDS from school.  See id.
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tation Act protects HIV-positive children and have affirmed their right to attend
public schools.53
Prior to the passage of the ADA, commentators on HIV and custody issues
relied on School Board of Nassau County v. Arline54 to argue that HIV should not
presumptively limit an award of custody.55  In Arline, the Supreme Court held
that the Rehabilitation Act prohibited a school board from dismissing a teacher
with tuberculosis, a contagious disease, if the teacher was “otherwise qualified”
to perform her job.56  Although the Rehabilitation Act is not the applicable law in
an individual custody determination, the legal analysis can be used to ensure
that a parent’s disability does not result in a per se denial of custody.  As in em-
ployment discrimination cases such as Arline, Family Court judges should con-
duct individual assessments based on the facts of the case to determine whether
a parent is “otherwise qualified” to care for the child.
When the ADA was signed into law,57 the HIV community had a renewed
sense of hope about their ability to use federal law to combat discrimination.58
The ADA significantly broadened the entities that are subject to its anti-
discrimination rules,59 and prohibited discrimination in public and private em-
ployment, public services, transportation, communications technology, and pub-
53. See Ray v. School Dist. of DeSoto County, 666 F. Supp. 1524, 1530-32 (M.D. Fla. 1987)
(granting a preliminary injunction prohibiting HIV testing of hemophiliac children); Thomas v.
Atascadero Unified Sch. Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376, 380 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (permitting kindergarten chil-
dren who were HIV-positive to attend regular classes).
54. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
55. See Barrett & Flint, supra note 3, at 188-90; Mahon, supra note 3, at 1130-31;.
56. See Arline, 480 U.S. at 285-87.
57. For a comprehensive overview of the ADA, see Leonard, supra note 40, at 301-03, 305-13.
58. See id. at 298; Gostin, supra note 47, at 269.
59. The Rehabilitation Act only applies to entities that receive federal funding.  See 29 U.S.C. §
794 (1994).  The ADA, by contrast, prohibits discrimination by employers with fifteen or more em-
ployees, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12112 (1994), by all public entities, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12132, and
by public accommodations and services operated by private entities, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12182.
The ADA, however, did not broaden who is protected by the ADA, i.e., who is considered disabled.
Rather, the definition of disability appears to be very similar to that under the Rehabilitation Act.
Compare 29 U.S.C. § 706(8) (1994), with 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994).  At least one commentator has
argued, rather, that recent litigation under the ADA and the resulting court interpretations have be-
gun to narrow the scope of who is disabled.  See Steven S. Locke, The Incredible Shrinking Protected
Class: Redefining the Scope of Disability Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 68 U. COLO. L. REV.
107, 110-15 (1997).
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lic accommodations.60  Regulations clarified the legislative intent that all HIV-
positive people are protected under this definition.61
In the family law setting, the ADA serves as an important backdrop for
protecting the rights of HIV-positive persons.  HIV advocates should rely on the
ADA to argue that judges should make case-by-case assessments of an HIV-
positive parent’s ability to care for a child.  In In re Carney,62 California’s highest
court concluded that a physical disability limiting a parent’s ability to participate
with his children in physical activities is not a changed circumstance sufficient to
warrant a change custody.63  The court referred to state and federal anti-
discrimination laws aimed at integrating disabled persons into the mainstream,
and stated that “[n]o less important to this policy is the integration of the handi-
capped into the responsibilities and satisfactions of family life, cornerstone of our
social system. . . .  [T]rial courts must avoid impairing or defeating [this] public
policy.”64  The Carney decision is significant precedent for relying on disability-
based anti-discrimination laws in custody and visitation cases.
In Family Court, the prejudice against individuals with substance abuse
also can be challenged using anti-discrimination laws.65  Unfortunately, indi-
viduals who have substance abuse problems, or histories of such problems, do
not have the same protections under the law as individuals with other disabili-
ties.66  The coverage of substance abusers in the Rehabilitation Act regulations
was based in part on the medical and psychological literature treating substance
abuse as a disease.67  The use of anti-discrimination law in the family law context
60. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994); see generally ACLU AIDS PROJECT, supra note 43, at 83-133.
61. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (1991).  The issue of whether HIV-infected individuals are protected
by the ADA has prompted much discussion.  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission regula-
tions state that all HIV-infected individuals, even those who are asymptomatic, are covered by the
ADA.  See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. (1997) (“Impairments . . . such as HIV are inherently substantially
limiting.”).  Many courts have agreed.  See, e.g., Abbott v. Bragdon, 108 F.3d 328 (1st Cir. 1997); Doe
v. Montgomery Hosp., No. CIV. A. 95-3168, 1996 WL 745524 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 23, 1996); Doe v. Kohn,
Nast & Graf, 866 F. Supp. 190 (E.D. Pa. 1994).  Other courts, however, have held that HIV-infected
individuals are not per se disabled and that disability should be determined on a case-by-case basis.
See Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 1997); Cortes v. McDonald’s Corp.,
955 F. Supp. 541 (E.D.N.C. 1996).  Ironically, considering HIV as “inherently limiting” and thus a
disability under the ADA has the opposite effect of what parties generally are trying to argue in
Family Court, namely that the disability will not have an impact on the child.  See In re Carney, 598
P.2d 36, 42-43 (Cal. 1979).
62. 598 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1979).
63. See id. at 44; see also discussion infra Part IV.A.
64. Carney, 598 P.2d at 45.
65. See discussion infra Part V.
66. For a thorough review of how the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA treat addicted individu-
als, see Anne Robbins, Employment Discrimination Against Substance Abusers: The Federal Response, 33
B.C. L. REV. 155, 167-90, 197-208 (1991).  While the Rehabilitation Act does not specifically cover ad-
dicted individuals, the implementing regulations state that “individuals with handicaps” includes
substance users for the purpose of general hospital outpatient treatment.  See 45 C.F.R. § 84.53
(1994).  The Act later was amended to exclude any alcohol or drug abuser “whose current use of al-
cohol or drugs prevents such individual from performing the duties of the job in question or whose
employment, by reason of such current alcohol or drug abuse, would constitute a direct threat to the
property or the safety of others.” 29 U.S.C. 706(8)(B) (1994); see also H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 95-1780, at
102 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7375, 7413.
67. See Robbins, supra note 66, at 173.
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to protect individuals with substance abuse problems is extremely limited be-
cause of the direct relationship between substance abuse and the ability to par-
ent.  Yet these laws may be helpful in cases where a litigant has been a substance
abuser in the past and is far along in the recovery process.68  In these cases, attor-
neys representing HIV-positive individuals with drug histories should educate
judges about substance abuse by relying on the public policy prohibiting dis-
crimination against substance users and on the literature establishing addiction
as an illness.
Although disability-based anti-discrimination law provides some ammuni-
tion with which to fight improper and arbitrary decisions in Family Court, its use
is limited in practice.  Family law has well-established legal standards on which
Family Court judges are accustomed to relying.  These standards include the
“best interests of the child,” preventing harm to the child, and “material change
of circumstances.”69  It is very difficult to convince judges making custody or
visitation determinations to rely on different legal standards, such as anti-
discrimination law, which they may not find relevant.  In Sherman  v. Sherman,70
the Tennessee Court of Appeals confronted this tension, noting that
[d]espite the specter of AIDS, this appeal is essentially a dispute between di-
vorced parents concerning visitation.  While the courts must be concerned when
the question of AIDS is raised in the context of child custody and visitation . . .
we should continue to apply the settled principles and precedents normally
brought to bear in [these] proceedings.  Existing law provides sufficient direc-
tion for dealing with AIDS in the context of domestic relations proceedings.  Ac-
cordingly, the possibility of exposure to [HIV] does not require us to fashion
new legal principles or to depart from existing law.71
This passage from the Sherman decision embodies the inclination of Family Court
judges to rely on well-settled family law principles.  While such reliance is
appropriate, Family Court judges should be prepared to evaluate these
standards in light of contemporary public policy considerations, as the court did
in Carney.72  Additionally, family law standards should evolve in the context of a
changing society.
Convincing Family Court judges in New York City to focus on unconven-
tional legal precedents is made more difficult by the overcrowded and stressful
conditions of Family Court.73  In these circumstances, it is difficult to get judges
to consider discrimination law at all.  The challenge for advocates of HIV-
68. The ADA definition of disability encompasses substance users and alcoholics, but the defi-
nition of “qualified individuals” excludes employees or applicants who are “engaging in the illegal
use of drugs, when the covered entity acts on the basis of such use.”  42 U.S.C. § 12114 (1994).  The
ADA states, however, that this provision is not meant to exclude individuals who have completed
or are participating in a supervised rehabilitation program and are no longer engaging in the use of
illegal drugs.  See id.
69. See supra note 33.
70. No. 01-A-01-9304-CH00188, 1994 WL 649148 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 18, 1994).
71. Id. at *4.
72. See Carney, 598 P.2d at 44.
73. See Sexton, supra note 31, at A1 (“The players themselves acknowledge that the system often
works badly or barely works at all, but they differ on where to place the blame.”).
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positive parents is to insist that judges give these cases the time and attention
they deserve.
IV.  THE LAW: HIV AND OTHER DISABILITIES IN CUSTODY AND VISITATION
DETERMINATIONS
A.  The Treatment of Disabilities in Custody Cases
[T]he essence of parenting . . . lies in the ethical, emotional, and intellectual
guidance the parent gives to the child throughout his formative years . . . a
handicapped parent is a whole person to the child who needs his affection,
sympathy, and wisdom to deal with the problems of growing up.  Indeed, in
such matters his handicap may well be an asset: few can pass through the cruci-
ble of severe physical disability without learning enduring lessons in patience
and tolerance.74
This passage represents the underlying philosophy of Carney, the seminal
California case on evaluating disability in custody determinations.  The Carney
court set aside prejudices about people with disabilities and addressed directly
what it meant to be a parent.75 The decision, cited most often by courts making
custody determinations where one of the parties is disabled,76 appears to be the
first case to rely on state disability law in a custody case.  The case also is note-
worthy because it articulates a standard for determining the effect of a disability
on a parent’s ability to care for the children.  This Part examines the relevance of
Carney in custody and visitation cases where one of the parties has a disability.
The court in Carney examined the effect of a custodial father’s paralysis on
his ability to care for his children in deciding whether the father’s disability was
a “changed circumstance” sufficient to warrant an award of custody to the
mother after the father had maintained custody for five years.77  The court held
that custody decisions cannot be based on a parent’s disability alone.78  Rather,
the court must evaluate carefully all the relevant facts to “determine whether the
parent’s condition will in fact have a substantial and lasting adverse effect on the
best interests of the child.”79  According to the court in Carney, the factors that
should be considered in determining whether a parent’s disability will have a
lasting impact on the child include: 1) the parent’s actual and potential physical
capabilities; 2) how the parent has adapted to the disability; 3) how the child and
other members of the household have adapted; and 4) any special contributions
the parent makes to the family.80
74. Carney, 598 P.2d at 44.
75. See id.
76. Many commentators have reviewed the Carney decision and the cases that follow it.  See
Barrett & Flint, supra note 3, at 176-78; Cooper, supra note 30, at 74-75; Mahon, supra note 3, at 1125-
28; see also Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Annotation, Parent’s Physical Disability or Handicap as Factor in
Custody Award or Proceedings, 3 A.L.R.4th 1044 (1981) (analyzing Carney and other cases that have
held that a parent’s physical disability does not render the parent per se unfit to have custody).
77. See Carney, 598 P.2d at 39-44.
78. See id. at 42.
79. Id.
80. See id.
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The Carney court was pioneering in both its understanding of prejudices
against people with disabilities and in its treatment of the father’s disability and
its impact on the children.  The father in Carney was a quadriplegic who was at-
tempting to overcome his severe physical limitations.  The court’s finding that
the father’s disability would not interfere with his parenting abilities was based
on the court’s vision of what it means to be a parent, as well as its disapproval of
the lower court’s judgment, which was “affected by serious misconceptions as to
the importance of the involvement of parent in the purely physical aspects of
their children’s lives.”81  The most significant contribution of Carney is the ar-
ticulation of factors that courts should consider, which are designed to eliminate
the consideration of prejudicial factors.  Advocates for parents with disabilities
must ensure that these factors are evaluated on a case-by-case determination.
The Carney decision, however, is of limited use to the Family Court practi-
tioner.  The factors listed in Carney, while focusing on seemingly objective stan-
dards, nonetheless leave open a wide margin for covert prejudices to surface.82
The decision also was based on an enlightened vision of parenting that other
courts may not share.  In addition, in crowded Family Court, such as in New
York City, judges often do not have time to reflect upon their own prejudices.83
Decisions about how complex cases such as these will proceed generally are
made from the bench in minutes.84  Courts frequently decline to consider factors
articulated in precedent because of time pressures.  Instead, judges react only to
the facts before them.
B.  The Treatment of HIV in Reported Custody Decisions
After more than fifteen years of the HIV epidemic, there are now many re-
ported cases examining the significance of a parent’s HIV status in the context of
custody cases.  This Part will examine four distinct themes addressed by these
cases: 1) HIV transmission and the risk of harm to the child; 2) a parent’s physi-
cal ability to care for the children; 3) a parent’s potentially shortened life span;
and 4) a parent’s failure to disclose his or her HIV status.
The potential risk of harm to the children is, of course, a relevant inquiry in
child custody determinations.  In considering the risk of harm to a child from a
parent’s HIV status, almost all of the HIV-related cases focus on whether the
81. Id. at 41.
82. See discussion infra Part VI (examining the pervasiveness of prejudice in a court where most
decisions are based on the court’s discretion).
83. See Sexton, supra note 31, at A1 (quoting a senior city prosecutor in Brooklyn as saying
“[t]here are judges with agendas”).
84. See THE FUND FOR MODERN COURTS, supra note 10, at 9 (stating that “judicial personnel of
the Family Court are severely overburdened,” and finding that judges spend very little time on each
case).
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children are at risk of HIV exposure.85  These cases uniformly hold that a parent’s
HIV status poses no threat to the child since HIV cannot be transmitted from a
parent to a child through casual contact.86  The cases rely on testimony presented
by medical experts at trial that HIV can only be transmitted perinatally or
through blood or blood products, sharing infected needles, or sexual contact in-
volving the exchange of bodily fluids.87  The cases also refer to other medical
studies and literature that establish how difficult it is for a parent to transmit
HIV to other household members.88  Such evidence refutes allegations that a par-
ent’s HIV infection places the children at risk of physical harm.
At this point in the HIV epidemic, the fact that HIV cannot be transmitted
through casual contact is so well-established that there should never be a need
for a hearing on this issue.  Even the most enlightened individuals, however,
may have hidden, albeit unfounded, fears about transmission.  This possibility
reflects the importance of raising the transmission issue even where it is not
raised by other parties; bringing such fears out in the open where they can be
confronted generally is preferable to the consequences of hidden apprehensions.
A more complex and challenging issue raised by some of the reported deci-
sions is whether a parent’s health status has an impact on her ability to care for
her children.  This inquiry requires an evaluation of the parent’s specific physical
and mental conditions and an examination of how the parent is dealing with
these conditions.  Curiously, none of the cases that address HIV in custody or
visitation determinations look to the standard articulated in Carney to determine
the parent’s ability to care for his or her children.89  In fact, the HIV-related cases
that have examined a parent’s physical capacity evaluate the facts without re-
gard to any legal standard.90
85. See, e.g., Stewart v. Stewart, 521 N.E.2d 956, 964 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (concluding that medi-
cal evidence and available studies indicate that AIDS is not transmitted through everyday house-
hold contact); Newton v. Riley, 899 S.W.2d 509, 511 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995) (concluding that there is no
risk of HIV-infection to children living with an HIV-positive step-parent and therefore finding no
reason to modify the custody order); Conkel v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d. 983, 987 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987)
(holding that an order granting a homosexual father increased visitation could not be overturned
where no evidence was presented that the father was HIV-positive); Doe v. Roe, 526 N.Y.S.2d 718,
725 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988) (stating that a claim that the children would be in danger from living with
their father if he was HIV-positive could not stand because of the overwhelming evidence that the
HIV virus is not spread casually); Steven L. v. Dawn J., 561 N.Y.S.2d 322, 324-25 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1990)
(reciting undisputed testimony that the HIV virus has not been contracted through everyday house-
hold contact).
86. See Stewart, 521 N.E.2d at 964.
87. See, e.g., Steven L., 561 N.Y.S.2d at 324-25; Jane W. v. John W., 519 N.Y.S.2d 603, 604 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1987).
88. See, e.g., Steven L., 561 N.Y.S.2d at 325; Doe, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 725.  For a discussion of this
evidence, see Helena Brett-Smith & Gerald H. Friedland, Transmission and Treatment, in AIDS LAW
TODAY, supra note 13, at 18, 23-29.
89. The Carney decision articulated four factors for courts to consider in deciding whether a
parent’s disability will affect the child’s best interest: how other members of the household have
adjusted to the disability; the special contributions made by the disabled parent in spite of, or be-
cause of, the disability; the disabled parent’s actual and potential physical abilities; and how the
parent had adapted to the disability.  See Carney, 598 P.2d at 42; see also supra notes 77-84 and ac-
companying text.
90. See, e.g., John T. v. Carraher, 538 N.W.2d 761 (Neb. Ct. App. 1995); Jane W., 519 N.Y.S.2d at
604; Steven L., 561 N.Y.S.2d at 324-25.
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For example, in Steven L. v. Dawn J.,91 a Family Court judge in Brooklyn
found that it would not be in the “child’s best interest to be left in the sole care of
a person who was seriously incapacitated because of an illness or disease.”92  The
court continued the award of custody to the mother because “although she has
felt weak at times, she has not been incapacitated by her condition and has
maintained primary care for her daughter at a high level of performance.”93
Without explicitly stating so, the court in Steven L. evaluated whether the parent
was the “sole” caretaker and whether she was “seriously incapacitated.”94  In this
case, the mother’s “high level of performance” was sufficient.95  The court raises
the question of whether a parent’s capacity should be evaluated in terms of
whether other caretakers are involved.
In Jane W. v. John W.,96 a mother sought to limit her daughter’s visitation
with her HIV-positive father who had developed several HIV-related conditions,
including tuberculosis and pneumostysis carinii pneumonis (PCP).97  The court re-
lied on traditional visitation case law that grants parents liberal visitation in the
absence of any harm to the child posed by the visits.98  In considering the father’s
rights, the court identified the only relevant issue as whether the father could
care for the child during visits.99  The court granted the father visitation since the
father was “entirely capable of caring for the child” and had cared for the child
throughout her life.100  Curiously, the court did not examine the father’s particu-
lar physical limitations even though he had serious medical conditions.101
Similarly, in  John T. v. Carraher,102 the court found that it was in the child’s
best interests to remain with his foster mother because her ability to care for him
was compromised only by her illness only “at an uncertain point in the future.
She is presently fully capable of parenting [the boy] . . . .” 103  In contrast, in H.J.B.
v. P.W.,104 the appellate court affirmed the lower court’s finding that a father’s
HIV status was a material change in circumstance despite a lack of any specific
91. 561 N.Y.S.2d 322 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1990).
92. Id. at 324.
93. Id. at 326.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. 519 N.Y.S.2d 603, 604 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987).
97. PCP is an HIV-related opportunistic infection caused by a parasite that naturally occurs in
almost every person’s lungs, becoming problematic when the immune system is stressed.  See JOHN
G. BARTLETT & ANN K. FINKBEINER, THE GUIDE TO LIVING WITH HIV INFECTION 63, 113 (1991).
98. See Jane W. v. John W., 519 N.Y.S.2d 603, 605 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987).
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. One explanation for the court’s failure to examine the father’s physical limitations is that the
case involved visitation with, not custody of, his child.  In visitation cases, the court is supposed to
consider whether visitation will cause danger to the child.  See supra note 37.  In custody cases, for
the most part, courts determine what is in the child’s best interests.  See supra note 33.  Based on
these legal standards, an evaluation of a parent’s physical abilities should be different in a visitation
case than a custody case.  In reality, courts seem equally concerned about the impact of an HIV-
positive parent’s illness in visitation cases as in custody cases, especially where overnight visits are
involved.
102. 538 N.W.2d 761 (Neb. Ct. App. 1995).
103. Id. at 771.
104. 628 So. 2d 753 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993).
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evidence of the father’s physical or emotional condition.105  The court instead fo-
cused on the father’s failure to disclose his HIV status to the court.106
In considering the physical capabilities of an HIV-positive parent, it is sig-
nificant that an HIV-positive person’s health is unpredictable, but likely will de-
teriorate over time and may lead to death.  The deterioration of a person’s health
is markedly different than disabilities such as the father’s paralysis in Carney,
which is not likely to lead to increased incapacity or death.  Most reported cus-
tody cases involving an HIV-infected parent do not address directly the parent’s
future death and its impact on the children.  While HIV-positive people are liv-
ing longer than in the past, and in fact could live a long time, a medical provider
cannot predict how long a particular parent will live.  Another characteristic that
distinguishes HIV from many disabilities is that an HIV-infected individual’s
physical condition will improve and deteriorate cyclically.107
Courts that have addressed the issue of a parent’s shortened life span have
held that this possibility should not justify removing children from their custo-
dial parent.108  The rationale for this policy is described eloquently by the court in
John T.:
Life is indeed uncertain, and no child is guaranteed that he or she will proceed
through childhood or adolescence with his or her parents healthy or even alive.
There is no doubt that parental illness and death are very hard on children.  It is
our task to put aside the fact that the foster mother has AIDS, an illness laden
with emotion.  Instead, we view the matter as we would a case involving any
potentially terminal illness of a parent. . . .  [P]arents suffer and die from illness,
and their children observe this and suffer with their parents.  However, the
children hopefully learn that although painful, death is a natural part of the cy-
cle of life.109
The critical point raised by the court in John T. is that courts cannot always
protect children from their pain and suffering.  The impulse to shield children
from suffering in Family Court is very strong, as the purpose of the court is to
protect children from harm.110  While this impulse is understandable, and the
goal of Family Court is laudable, judges often are forced to try to accomplish the
105. See id. at 754-56.
106. See id.
107. See Brett-Smith & Friedland, supra note 88, at 38; see also BARTLETT & FINKBEINER, supra note
97, at 50-51 (describing typical developments of  HIV infection).
108. See John T. v. Carraher, 538 N.W.2d 701, 772-73 (Neb. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that a foster
mother’s HIV status did not justify the removal of her foster child from the home); Doe v. Roe, 526
N.Y.S.2d 718, 726 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988) (denying maternal grandparents’ motion to compel father to
submit to an HIV test because even if father had AIDS and a shortened life span, this would not jus-
tify removing children from their long-term custodian).
109. John T., 538 N.W.2d at 772-73.  Although John T. deals with a foster mother, not a biological
parent, the language in the case can be applied to biological parents or other caretakers.  In fact, the
court in John T. found that the foster parents were “parents” in the child’s eyes.  See id. at 772.
110. It is generally agreed that courts with jurisdiction over custody disputes serve both a child
protective function and a private dispute resolution function.  See THE FUND FOR MODERN COURTS,
supra note 10, at 4; Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of
Indeterminancy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 291-93 (Summer 1975).
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impossible task of safeguarding children from emotionally difficult situations.111
HIV advocates must challenge courts to resist the impulse to protect children
from painful situations without regard for the rights of the parents and the well-
being of the family.  In the case of a seriously incapacitated parent, courts should
look carefully at the facts to determine whether the children’s physical and emo-
tional needs are being met.  In this way, the court will be assured that there is no
“substantial and lasting adverse effect on the best interests of the child.”112
The articles and commentaries examining the issue of HIV and custody fail
to note that the HIV status of many HIV-positive individuals is not known at the
outset to the court or to other parties involved in the litigation.113  In most of these
cases, it will be unnecessary to disclose a party’s HIV status because it is not
relevant to the case.114  Attorneys should consider, however, that in certain cases,
failure to disclose one’s status has been noted disapprovingly by the court.  In
H.J.B. v. P.W.,115  a lower court’s finding that the father lacked credibility was up-
held where “the father failed to disclose his true medical condition until the day
of trial, and that he failed to disclose pertinent evidence as to his personal
health . . . .”116  The court had noted that this failure was
tantamount to an attempt to secrete his true health status from the Court. . . .
[This had] the effect of casting suspicion on the credibility of his testimony pre-
viously given . . . regarding his views toward promiscuity, the gay lifestyle and
his fears of danger attending each.  Certainly, this is an issue which could have a
111. The impulse is, of course, not limited to Family Court judges.  Many adults feel that chil-
dren should not be confronted with, and should be sheltered from, issues surrounding serious ill-
ness and death.  See Karolynn Siegel et al., Psychosocial Adjustment of Children with a Terminally Ill
Parent, 31 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 327, 327 (1992).
112. In re Carney, 598 P.2d 36, 42 (Cal. 1979).
113. The fact that HIV is not known to others might mean that HIV-related discrimination is not
present; it does not negate, however, the importance of the parent’s HIV status in a case.  Attorneys
should talk to their clients about whether the client should disclose their status to their children,
relatives, case workers, and the court.  Such discussions are necessary to determine whether disclo-
sure will resolve a tension that exists because the party’s HIV status is being withheld.  Very often
disclosure will explain behavior, such as frequent medical appointments or hospitalizations, that
otherwise may trouble the court or child welfare workers.  Disclosure also may help the client
achieve his or her objectives in the litigation.  If, for example, a case is being delayed or visitation is
limited, disclosure may help advance the case.  Ultimately, the parent must balance the benefit of
disclosing the information with the potential harm of stigma that such disclosure may cause.  Dis-
closure issues and a parent’s confidentiality rights are discussed more fully infra Part V.
114. The client is under no obligation to disclose this information, and most clients choose not to
disclose their status to the court because of a fear of discrimination.  If their medical condition has
been put at issue, however, then the client must comply with requests for information about their
medical condition.  In one case, a judge advised us that if our client refused to provide medical rec-
ords, then she would make an “adverse inference” against him about his medical condition.  Clients
should be advised about this possibility up front so that they are prepared to share this information
if necessary.
115. 628 So. 2d 753 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993).
116. Id. at 754-55.
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significant bearing on the mental, physical, emotional and spiritual well-being
of the minor child involved and should be taken into consideration . . . .117
The court in John T.118  also examined a foster mother’s failure to disclose her
HIV status, but treated the case differently.  The court held that it was in the
child’s best interests to remain with the foster mother and her husband.119  The
foster mother had failed to disclose her illness in her initial foster parent appli-
cation, and the court acknowledged that if she had disclosed her HIV status, her
application probably would have been denied.120  The court noted, however, that
the child had been living with the foster mother for years, and had come to rec-
ognize her as his parent.121
The court in John T. found that the foster mother’s “deception” should not
be used to decide the outcome of the case, which instead should be based on the
best interests of the child.122  The court stated that “[w]e cannot say it is per se
against the child’s best interests that his parents have hidden a health condition
which generates from some quarters a degree of discrimination, hysteria and
paranoia.”123  This statement reflects an understanding of how difficult it is for
many HIV-positive individuals to disclose their HIV status because they fear
discrimination and prejudice.  This fear is even more pronounced in the context
of Family Court and the foster care system, where the individual has much at
stake in getting custody of, or visitation with, her children.  Parents should be
mindful, however, that their failure to disclose their status may be perceived
negatively by the court.
V.  BARRIERS HIV-INFECTED PARENTS FACE IN THE COURTROOM
This Part examines how the Family Court process and factors that are en-
demic to Family Court result in discriminatory and harmful treatment of HIV
litigants.  The most significant factors to consider in this analysis are the discre-
tion of judges, the extensive time delays and postponements in Family Court,
and the disclosure of a parent’s HIV status by investigators or other parties.
Each of these factors and how they result in the unfair treatment of HIV-positive
parties in Family Court will be examined in turn.
Judges have a great deal of discretion both in how cases proceed and in the
ultimate outcome of the case.  Nowhere is this discretion more pronounced than
in Family Court, where the legal standards relied upon inherently are subjec-
117. Id. at 755 (quotations omitted); see also John T., 538 N.W.2d at 770-71 (stating that the court is
not unconcerned about deception practiced by foster parents in failing to reveal the foster mother’s
HIV positive status).
118. 538 N.W.2d 761 (Neb. Ct. App. 1995)
119. See id. at 773.
120. See id. at 771.
121. See id. at 772.
122. See id. at 771.
123. See id. at 772.  The court refers to Doe v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376, 385 (D.N.J.
1990) (finding that a police officer’s disclosure of the plaintiff’s HIV status violated the Fourteenth
Amendment), for examples of such strong reactions.
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tive.124  These standards leave open many opportunities for a judge to inject bias
or prejudice against an individual based on race, ethnicity, disability or per-
ceived disability, and whether an individual has a substance use addiction or
history of addiction.  Prejudice also can be based on the personal characteristics
or qualities of a litigant, such as their personality or how they dress.
The impact of prejudice and bias on HIV-positive litigants is not limited to
judges.  Most cases involving foster care or custody disputes also involve a
court-appointed lawyer for the children.  In New York, these attorneys are called
“law guardians.”125  Law guardians yield vast power in custody and foster care
cases.  Faced with complicated and emotional cases, and with overcrowded and
stressful conditions, judges are inclined to follow the law guardian’s recommen-
dation.126  Without sufficient resources and training on complex issues such as
HIV or drug addiction, law guardians often recommend what the child wants,
without making a proper determination about whether what the child wants also
is in the child’s best interests.127  In cases in which HIV is a relevant issue, the law
guardians’ lack of HIV-related information and training is troublesome, par-
ticularly since they are making recommendations that often are given the most
weight in court.
Inherent bias and prejudice invariably have a huge impact on a practice that
involves representing poor HIV-positive people, most of whom are African-
American and/or Latina.  Judges often make presumptions about litigants based
on their race and economic status and often are misinformed about the nature of
HIV.  One of the most difficult aspects of challenging discrimination in court is
that it rarely is articulated expressly by the court or by other parties.  In many
cases, the judge and other parties are not even aware of their own biases.  Subtle
forms of prejudice are difficult to realize and confront in the course of litigation.
The frequently disparaging attitude of judges, opposing counsel, and law
guardians toward an individual with a history of substance use is the most
124. The role of the judge’s discretion in Family Court cases and the highly subjective nature of
the decisions have been widely discussed.  See, e.g., Mahon, supra note 3, at 1096-97, 1108 (“More
than any other type of legal dispute, child custody and visitation battles invite judges to use their
personal perceptions, ideals, and prejudices to arrive at their determinations.”).  Nevertheless, judi-
cial decisionmaking in these cases is highly complex.  See Mnookin, supra note 110, at 255-62
(analyzing the complexity of judicial determinations in terms of limited information available to the
judge, the difficulty in predicting outcomes, and the need to assign values in assessing possible out-
comes).
125. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 242, 249 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1997-1998) (requiring a law
guardian to be appointed in all child protective proceedings).
126. See Kim Nauer, Guilty Until Proven Innocent, CITY LIMITS, Nov. 1994, at 22 (noting that be-
cause “no one—including judges—wants to be blamed for putting a child back into [an unsafe home
environment],” the child welfare agency’s decision regarding the child is almost always followed by
the court).  A lawyer’s representation of children raises complex issues about the lawyer/client rela-
tionship and the role of the lawyer with respect to client decisionmaking.  See generally Michael J.
Dale, Practical Considerations in Representing Children, in REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLIENT ch. 9 (Mark
I. Soler et al. eds., 1992).
127. The role of a child’s wishes in custody cases is discussed in more detail infra notes 165-74
and accompanying text.
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common and difficult bias to address in court.128  Too often, hysteria and stereo-
types about parents with drug use histories dominate the decisionmaking proc-
ess about whether children are at risk from a parent’s drug addiction or history
of drug addiction.129  The improper reliance on stereotypes and prejudice stems
from negative attitudes toward drug users,130 a lack of training on the part of
judges and child welfare workers about drug addiction, treatment, and recov-
ery,131 and a lack of “consistently applicable criteria” for measuring the risk of
danger to children.132  In foster care cases, judges routinely rely on the child pro-
tective agency to make a decision about the children and then follow that deci-
sion without examining whether the facts of the case support the agency’s deci-
sion.133  Yet in cases involving drug addiction, child protective workers and other
professionals “often feel angry with women who use drugs heavily,” which can
interfere with the service providers’ ability to help the women and provide them
with needed services.134  As a result, regardless of what they have accomplished
in their lives, parents who have histories of drug abuse face an uphill battle in
overcoming these histories and in regaining custody of their children.135  Moreo-
ver, attitudes about drug abuse often have racial overtones.136  Unfortunately,
these cases are complicated further by the fact that drug addiction is difficult for
individuals to overcome and the process often involves periods of relapse.137
Furthermore, a parent’s drug addiction has a profound impact on her children
even where the parent has overcome her addiction.138
The sluggish speed of the Family Court, perhaps more than any other fac-
tor, has a discriminatory effect on people with HIV.  Although people with HIV
can live for a long time, especially with the advent of combination therapies,139
128. See generally Mary E. Taylor, Annotation, Parent’s Use of Drugs as Factor in Award of Custody
of Children, Visitation Rights, or Termination of Parental Rights, 20 A.L.R.5th 534 (1995 & Supp. 1997)
(describing how common it is for drug abusing parents to lose parental rights or at least the right to
custody or visitation).
129. See Azzi-Lessing & Olsen, supra note 30, at 17 (discussing the negative impact drug abuse
has on the custody claims of parents, particularly mothers).
130. See id. at 16-18.
131. See id.
132. See Barry Zuckerman, Effects on Parents and Children, in WHEN DRUG ADDICTS HAVE
CHILDREN: REORIENTING CHILD WELFARE’S RESPONSE 49, 56 (Douglas Besharov ed., 1994).
133. See Nauer, supra note 126, at 20, 22 (describing how courts generally follow a course that
they perceive as legally “safe” in foster care cases).
134. See Zuckerman, supra note 132, at 55.
135. See generally RICHARD WEXLER, WOUNDED INNOCENTS: THE REAL VICTIMS OF THE WAR
AGAINST CHILD ABUSE 212-18, 269-71 (1990) (describing how parents with drug use histories are mis-
treated by the child welfare system, including the tendency of agencies to demand ideal parenting
before children can be returned home).
136. See PHILLIP O. COFFIN, THE LINDESMITH CTR., COCAINE & PREGNANCY 2 (1997) (“Regardless
of similar or equal levels of illicit drug use during pregnancy, African-American and Latina women
constitute 80% of those prosecuted for delivering drug-exposed children and are much more likely
than Caucasian women to be reported to child welfare agencies for prenatal drug use.” (citations
omitted)).
137. See Azzi-Lessing & Olsen, supra note 30, at 17.
138. See Zuckerman, supra note 132, at 60-61 (observing that substance abuse negatively affects
parents and children).
139. See discussion infra Part VII.
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many litigants in court already are sick and do not know how long they will live.
Even those who are well live with the fear that they could become sick at any
time.  Living with HIV therefore adds a sense of urgency to the process of gain-
ing custody of, or visitation with, their children.  The stress of Family Court itself
often makes people increasingly ill.
In one typical case, South Brooklyn Legal Services represented a father,
Henri, in a custody petition he filed against his sister-in-law.  The sister-in-law, a
doctor, had moved to New York City from Tennessee to take care of Henri’s
children after his wife had died.140  Henri was sick, but still was able to take care
of himself and his children with assistance.  In opposing Henri’s custody peti-
tion, his sister-in-law submitted an affidavit from the deceased mother saying
that Henri had an alcohol problem.141  On Henri’s behalf, South Brooklyn Legal
Services submitted evidence from his social worker and his treating doctor, both
of whom had been working with him for years, that these allegations were un-
true.  Despite the fact that the only evidence of Henri’s alcoholism was the de-
ceased mother’s affidavit, the court was reluctant to increase visitation until
mental health exams were performed.  It took nearly a year for these exams to be
completed.  During this year, South Brooklyn Legal Services repeatedly made
motions for increased visits and gradually succeeded in increasing visits from
three hours of supervised visits a week to weekend visits.  In light of the father’s
right to custody under the appropriate legal standard of a parent against a non-
parent,142 this was a small victory.
Unfortunately, Henri’s case is not unusual.  The Family Court process is ar-
duous, and it is hard particularly on parties who do not have custody or visita-
tion with their children.  For people with HIV, it potentially has even more dra-
matic consequences.  As the cases of Denise143 and Henri illustrate, the length and
stress of the process may mean that HIV-infected parents become increasingly ill
while being unable to spend quality time with their children before their death.
Unwarranted or unfair HIV disclosure by other parties in court is an addi-
tional factor that can affect HIV-positive litigants adversely by infringing upon
140. Henri had been separated from his wife for three years when she died.  Six months before
her death, he had filed a visitation petition against her because she suddenly had ceased visitation.
The petition still was pending when she died, and he still had not obtained visitation privileges with
the children.  At the time, Henri was living with his fiancée and had a home attendant.
141. The affidavit was written in support of the mother’s last will and testament, which ap-
pointed her sister as a guardian.  Some law offices have their clients sign such affidavits when they
are not appointing the other living parent as the guardian.
142. See supra note 8.
143. See discussion supra Part I.
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their right to the confidentiality of their HIV-related medical information.144
How an attorney should address disclosure and confidentiality concerns de-
pends on the source and purpose of the disclosure.  In Family Court cases, HIV
confidentiality issues arise in cases where an individual’s status is disclosed by
an opposing party in court papers, orally in court by opposing counsel, or by a
child welfare worker assigned to or investigating the case for the court, or a
mental health expert examining parties in the case.
It is common for a party’s HIV status to be disclosed in court papers, in-
cluding petitions, answers, and reports of court-ordered investigations.  In
Brooklyn Family Court, clerks draft petitions based on the information provided
by the petitioner.  The petition then is served on the respondent, sometimes by
leaving it at the respondent’s house.  In these cases, the information often is visi-
ble to anyone in the household.  Similarly, court-ordered investigations some-
times result in written reports that indicate a party’s HIV status.  These reports
then are provided to the court and the other parties in the case and their attor-
neys.
In one of the Project’s cases, Jackie found a custody petition posted on her
door regarding her adult daughters’ children who lived with her.  The petition
alleged that Jackie had HIV and might be hospitalized one day, even though
Jackie did not have custody of her grandchildren.  I made a successful motion to
redact her HIV status from the custody petition based on the potential for harm
to her and because the information was irrelevant, as my client was asymptom-
atic and was not the legal custodian.  My client was satisfied with the result be-
cause she did not want this information to be in included in the court file, where
it could be used against her later.  She also had been concerned about disclosure
to other household members.  Making a motion to redact HIV-related informa-
tion and/or to seal the record is one way to reduce the potential for injury in an
individual case.  Unfortunately, once the information has been disclosed to
household members or to other individuals, some harm may have occurred.
In the case of court-ordered investigations, the attorney has slightly more
control over disclosure.  Prior to disclosure, the attorney should prepare the cli-
ent for the fact that the information may be disclosed in a written report.  The
attorney also can encourage the investigator not to disclose the information.
Over the years, investigators have dealt with this problem of confidentiality by
indicating that the parent has a “terminal” or “chronic” illness instead of HIV.
144. Most states have statutes that protect HIV-related information.  See, e.g., AIDS Confidential-
ity Act of Illinois, 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/9 (West 1997); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2782 (McKinney
1996 & Supp. 1997-1998).  The right to HIV confidentiality also has been recognized as a constitu-
tional right to privacy.  See Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that the
New York City Human Rights Commission violated the plaintiff’s right to privacy by issuing a press
statement that included sufficient information to identify him and his HIV status); Doe v. Borough
of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376 (D.N.J. 1990) (finding that family members’ privacy rights were vio-
lated by disclosure of their HIV status); Woods v. White, 689 F. Supp. 874 (W.D. Wis. 1988), aff’d, 899
F.2d 17 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that a prisoner’s right to privacy was violated by the disclosure of
his HIV status by prison medical staff to non-medical personnel and other inmates).  A litigant’s
right to confidentiality in Family Court is circumscribed by the court’s need for information to de-
termine what is in the child’s best interests.  For example, in New York, a parent waives his or her
psychologist-client privileges by contesting custody and, thereby, putting her mental and physical
well-being at issue.  See Baecher v. Baecher, 396 N.Y.S.2d 447, 448 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977).
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In reality, the court and other parties know that this usually is a disguise for
HIV.  The best way to address these issues is systemic; HIV advocates and the
courts should develop policies and procedures that protect parties from the dis-
closure of their HIV-related information in petitions and court-ordered investi-
gations.145
Disclosure by another party in court raises different issues.  These disclo-
sures clearly are legal, as disclosures by private parties do not violate most con-
fidentiality laws or the Constitution.146  The advocate’s role in these cases is to en-
sure that the HIV-related information is not considered improperly by the court.
The attorney must evaluate whether the disclosure is relevant to the proceeding,
as it is many cases.  If a party’s HIV status is being disclosed by an attorney for
no reason other than to prejudice an opposing party, then the HIV advocate
should rely on local ethical rules prohibiting such behavior to challenge the dis-
closure.  The advocate then either can ask the judge to admonish the attorney or
can make a complaint to the disciplinary committee against the proffering attor-
ney.
The disclosure of a parent’s HIV status by child protective agencies to other
parties is more actionable than disclosure by private parties or by investigators
in a court-ordered investigation.  In my own experience and discussions with
other HIV advocates, it is common for foster care agencies and child welfare
agencies to disclose a parent’s HIV status improperly to other family members,
neighbors, or friends.  Such disclosures have the potential to cause extreme pain
to an HIV-positive individual who may not be prepared to disclose this infor-
mation and probably would not want it disclosed in this manner.  In one case,
the Legal Action Center filed a law suit on behalf of the parent against what was
then known as the Child Welfare Agency (“CWA”), alleging that the CWA im-
properly disclosed a parent’s HIV status to police officers, who then disclosed
the information to neighbors and friends of the family.147  In addition to individ-
ual relief, the complaint asked the court to force the CWA to develop written
protocols and training procedures to ensure confidentiality.148  The case was set-
tled by the parties, unfortunately, without the agency agreeing to develop such
policies and procedures.149  HIV advocates should address these confidentiality
issues by holding child protective agencies accountable through litigation, as did
the Legal Action Center.  In addition, advocates should work with child protec-
145. See infra Part VIII.
146. The New York State HIV Confidentiality Law, for example, prohibits disclosure by health
and social service providers and state and local government agencies and employees who provide
health or social services.  See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2782 (McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1997-1998).
An individual’s right to privacy is grounded in the Due Process Clause of the Constitution, which
has been interpreted to prohibit unnecessary governmental disclosures of medical information.  See
Doe v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376, 382 (D.N.J. 1990) (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S.
589, 599-600 (1977) (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment protects an individual’s interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters)).
147. See Estate of Mary Doe v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., No. 93 Civ. 8385(JFK)(MHD),
1995 WL 619864, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 1995).
148. See id. at *2.
149. See Interview with Susan Jacobs, Senior Staff Attorney, Legal Action Center, in New York,
N.Y. (Sept. 25, 1997).
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tive agencies to ensure appropriate policies and procedures for protecting confi-
dentiality.
VI.  SEEMINGLY NEUTRAL FACTORS THAT RESULT IN DISCRIMINATORY RULINGS
This Part discusses factual considerations that are raised in court, either by
judges or by other parties in cases involving foster care, custody, or visitation,
that present unique challenges to HIV-positive parents.  The primary considera-
tions are the parent’s physical ability to care for the children, the parent’s possi-
ble death and long-term ability to provide for the children, the emotional harm
to the children of being exposed to the parent’s illness, and the children’s wishes
not to visit or live with the parent.150  Each of these factors appear to be neutral,
nondiscriminatory factors.  Because these factors are related directly to the par-
ent’s HIV status, however, their presence in a case creates a strong likelihood of
discrimination, even if such discrimination is unintentional or is hidden behind
seemingly benevolent motivations.
As discussed above, none of the HIV-related reported cases follow the
standard articulated in Carney or offer an alternative standard for evaluating
whether an HIV-infected parent physically is able to care for a child.151  Without
an established standard for courts to follow in assessing whether, and how, a
parent’s physical impairments should affect a custody or visitation determi-
nation, there is ample opportunity for courts to deny, inappropriately, custody
or visitation to an ill parent.  In practice, a parent’s physical limitations often
have a profound impact on how the court proceeds, and there are many unan-
swered questions about how these limitations should be assessed.
The evaluation of a parent’s illness on a child is slippery in nature.  For ex-
ample, South Brooklyn Legal Services represented a mother, Eleanor, in a cus-
tody case filed by the father of her twelve-year-old son Darren.152  The father’s
petition sought custody solely on the ground that the mother physically was in-
capable of caring for her son because she was HIV-positive. Eleanor had cared
for Darren for most of his life, and changing custody would separate him from
150. Another significant factor, which this article will not address in detail, is the child’s HIV
status.  In many cases, the child’s HIV status will be raised as a justification for not awarding cus-
tody of the child, or returning the child, to the parent.  Generally, the rationale provided is that the
parent is not prepared to deal with the child’s special needs.  In reality, a child’s HIV status often is
raised by parties or the court because they blame the mother for giving her child HIV.
151. See supra Part IV.
152. Eleanor and her husband separated when Darren was three, and Eleanor was given cus-
tody.  She also had a five-year-old daughter who had a different father.  Eleanor was very incapaci-
tated; her mother had come up from the South to live with her, and she had a home attendant and a
caretaker for the children.  Darren, however, was having a very hard time with his mother’s illness,
and wanted to live with his father so that he did not have to witness his mother’s illness.
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his sister.153  The evidence also showed that he was being cared for adequately.
Darren was dressed every day, taken to school, and had all his meals prepared
for him; his grandmother helped him with his homework.  Despite this evidence,
however, the judge made it clear from the beginning that she intended to grant
custody to the father; she seemed to be influenced strongly by the son’s desire to
live with his father.154
The standard governing this case was whether there was a “material change
in circumstances” that affected Darren’s best interests warranting a change in
custody.155  While the mother’s change in health was indisputably a “material
change in circumstance,” the more difficult determination was whether remov-
ing him from his mother’s custody was in Darren’s best interests.  In this case,
Eleanor did everything she could to make sure her child was provided for, and
the child was in no physical danger.  Nonetheless, the judge assumed that it
would be in Darren’s best interests to change custody to the father because his
mother was terminally ill.  The judge did not consider carefully how Darren’s
exposure to his mother’s terminal illness, as compared to his removal from her
care, affected his best interests.  Rather, the judge assumed, without the benefit
of any expert testimony, that it would be in Darren’s best interests to be with his
healthy father rather than to witness his mother’s illness.  Without a standard for
evaluating how exposure to a parent’s illness affects the child’s best interests, the
illness can be used unfairly against the parent, as it was in this case.
An issue related to the parent’s current physical capabilities is the parent’s
possible future death and inability to provide for the child.  The issue of perma-
nency and a parent’s future health status often is raised in the context of foster
care cases, perhaps because of the requirements of the federal Adoption Assis-
tance and Child Welfare Act of 1980.156  The concept of “permanency planning”157
originates in the Act, which was passed in response to a foster care reform
movement to reduce the amount of time children spend in foster care and to
153. In most jurisdictions, keeping siblings together is an important factor to consider in custody
cases.  See, e.g., Eschbach v. Eschbach, 436 N.E.2d 1260 (N.Y. 1982).  In Eshbach, the New York Court
of Appeals noted that “the stability and companionship to be gained from keeping the children to-
gether is an important factor for the court to consider [in custody cases]. . . .  ‘[Siblings] need each
other’s strengths and association in their everyday and often common experiences, and to separate
them, unnecessarily, is likely to be traumatic and harmful.’”  Id. at 1264 (citation omitted).  For addi-
tional cases discussing why siblings should be kept together, see MCCAHEY ET AL., supra note 4, § 12-
36, 37.
154. See discussion infra notes 170-72 and accompanying text (discussing the role of the child’s
wishes in these cases).
155. See supra note 33 (providing a description of the legal standard in cases involving a change
in custody).
156. Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
157. “Permanency planning” is a term now used widely in the HIV community to describe an
HIV-positive parent’s process of planning for what will happen to their children in the event that the
parent becomes incapacitated or dies.  Many HIV advocates prefer to use an alternative term for this
process, “future care and custody planning,” so the terms are not confused.  Permanency planning is
being used here in its original meaning under federal foster care law.
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provide them with permanency.158  Federal law requires that children in foster
care be reunified with their families as soon as possible and be freed for adoption
or guardianship when reunification is not possible.159  The child must have a
permanency plan that is reviewed every six months and a hearing on the perma-
nent plan for the child after twelve months.160
Parents with children in the foster care system, as compared to those seek-
ing custody, face additional barriers to maintaining their relationships with their
children because they are subject to greater scrutiny about their behavior and
parenting abilities.161  For HIV-positive parents in this environment, their HIV
status often is used against them,162 and they may face greater barriers to seeking
custody and visitation than do parents in custody cases.  The foster care system’s
emphasis on the child’s permanency plan encourages foster care workers to
question what will happen to the children in the future if they are returned to
their parent.  Often, workers question the wisdom of returning the child if the
parent is going to become sick and die.163  Usually, the presumption is unspoken
and therefore is difficult to challenge directly.
In the case of Robert, however, this unfair presumption was raised overtly.
Robert’s case illustrates many of the problems a parent experiences in seeking
reunification with a child who has been in foster care.  Robert came to the Project
seeking the return of his two-year-old daughter from foster care.  She had been
living with her mother’s aunt in kinship foster care since her birth.  Although
Robert had been visiting with his daughter regularly and had been drug-free for
more than two years, the foster care agency had done little to make preparations
for Robert to be reunified with his daughter.  In addition, both the foster parent
and foster care worker had made several comments to Robert indicating that
they did not think the child should live with him because he was HIV-positive;
they were concerned that he could not care adequately for his daughter.
The Project opposed the agency’s petition to extend foster care placement in
court, and helped Robert to document his efforts to prepare for his daughter’s
return, which included counseling and acquiring parenting and homemaking
158. See generally Mark Hardin, Legal Placement Options to Achieve Permanence for Children in Foster
Care, in FOSTER CHILDREN IN THE COURTS 128, 128-92 (Mark Hardin ed., 1983) (explaining the move-
ment to enact laws that ensure children stability in permanent settings); John J. Musewicz, The Fail-
ure of Foster Care: Federal Statutory Reform and the Child’s Right to Permanence, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 633,
633-765 (1981) (discussing federal reforms designed to ensure a child’s right to a “healthy and se-
cure” family environment).
159. See 42 U.S.C. § 675 (1994).
160. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 675(5)(B), (C) (West Supp. 1997).
161. This additional scrutiny may seem fair since parents in foster care cases either have placed
their children in foster care voluntarily or have been determined to have abused or neglected their
children.  In fact, the standard in foster care cases is less strict than in custody cases that look at the
best interests of the child.  The stated standard of review is lower than in a custody battle between
two parents, but in practice, there is far greater scrutiny in these types of cases.  In New York foster
care cases, for example, the state must prove that returning children to their parents would not place
them in imminent danger of becoming neglected.  See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1031 (McKinney 1983 &
Supp. 1997-1998).
162. See Felicia R. Lee, Difficult Custody Decisions Being Complicated by AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4,
1995, at A1 (discussing the foster care system’s reluctance to return children to HIV-infected par-
ents).
163. See id.
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services.  In court, the foster care agency did not raise Robert’s HIV status as a
barrier to returning the child.  The judge consequently examined the only rele-
vant issue in the case—Robert’s fitness as a parent—and he was able to regain
custody of his daughter.  Without aggressive advocacy, Robert likely would
have been unsuccessful in challenging the foster care agency in court.
While a parent’s future health status and possible death may be used inap-
propriately in a particular case, these issues are relevant in foster care and cus-
tody cases.164  It is important to inquire about the child’s long-term stability and
to ask whether the parent has an appropriate plan in place for the child’s future.
Although HIV-positive parents should not be held to a higher standard than
other parents whose futures likewise are uncertain, parents faced with a terminal
illness nonetheless can benefit from developing such plans.  Parents should
never be denied custody because their children may be taken care of by someone
else in the future.  At the same time, parents should be prepared to show that
they have a viable plan in place for their children and to demonstrate that cus-
tody and visitation arrangements are consistent with that future custody plan.
For example, if the plan stipulates that a cousin will have custody of the chil-
dren, it is helpful to show how the cousin currently is involved in the children’s
lives.  If a parent has a plan in place, the issue of the child’s permanency should
never be a barrier to obtaining or maintaining custody.
The emotional effect of a child’s exposure to her parent’s illness is another
factor often raised in court to deny or limit custody or visitation.165  These allega-
tions are very difficult to challenge because emotional harm to a child is un-
doubtedly a relevant consideration in custody and visitation cases.  Yet the fact
that the parent’s illness causes the children pain should not be the basis of a
custody decision.166  The inquiry into the child’s emotional response to illness or
death should be even less relevant in cases where the legal standard is the fitness
of a parent, rather than the broader standard of “best interests.”167  The parent
should be required to show only that they are dealing with the emotional diffi-
culties the children may be experiencing, for example, by facilitating therapy or
counseling for the children.  The HIV advocate should be prepared to demon-
strate through expert psychological testimony that while witnessing the illness of
a parent may be difficult emotionally, removing the child from the parent, or
hiding the illness, may cause even more harm to the child.168  Further, the advo-
164. The possibility or likelihood of a parent’s death is a difficult consideration for courts and
other parties to raise directly.  It is important for HIV advocates to recognize that even if this issue is
not raised, it may be relevant and therefore it is important to confront it directly.
165. See Melvin Lewis, The Special Case of the Uninfected Child in the HIV-Affected Family: Normal
Developmental Tasks and the Child’s Concerns About Illness and Death, in FORGOTTEN CHILDREN OF THE
AIDS EPIDEMIC 50, 51 (Shelley Geballe et al. eds., 1995) (suggesting that in some circumstances a
child of an HIV-positive parent “may only develop an insecure or anxious attachment to the care-
takers and a limited sense of self-worth”).
166. See John T. v. Carraher, 538 N.W.2d 761, 772-73 (Neb. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the De-
partment of Social Services could not remove a child from his foster home because of his foster
mother’s HIV-infection).
167. See supra note 33 (discussing the differing legal standards for custody).
168. See Steven L. v. Dawn J., 561 N.Y.S.2d 322, 324 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1990) (describing a doctor’s
testimony that when a parent is dying, custodial changes should be minimized to prevent further
harm to the child).
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cate should argue that it may be in the child’s best interests to remain with the
parent so that the child can process her loss with the parent instead of on her
own after the parent’s death.169
The relationship between the parent’s illness and the child’s reaction to it is
more complex when the child expresses that she does not want to live with, or
visit, an HIV-positive parent.  Although the child’s preference is only one factor
to be considered in a custody case, that preference could play a deciding role.170
Courts must consider whether the child is of sufficient age and maturity to make
an intelligent choice,171 must ascertain the child’s preference, and must give an
appropriate weight to the preference.  Naturally, the older a child is, the more
likely the judge will consider the child’s wishes as a factor.172
Although the child’s wishes regarding custody is not an issue raised solely
in HIV cases, it is brought up frequently in these cases and fosters unique con-
cerns.  In HIV-related cases, the child’s wishes are influenced, and often con-
fused, by a fear of the parent’s illness and possible death, as well as by feelings
of anger and guilt about the parent’s illness and, in some cases, possible sub-
stance use.  The feelings of children whose parents have AIDS are complicated
by the stigma of AIDS as socially unacceptable.  These powerful and confusing
feelings warrant the intervention of a professional to help the child sort out these
emotions.
The role of the HIV advocate in these cases is to insist that the court and
other involved parties look more deeply into what the child is saying to examine
other issues that may be present.  The best strategy is for the advocate to arrange
therapy for the child, or for the parent and child, if possible.  Therapy will give
children the opportunity to express their feelings of fear and anger to their par-
ents, which they otherwise may not be able to do.  In Eleanor’s case,173 her child’s
wishes could have determined the outcome of the case even though he was only
twelve years old and was experiencing great difficulty watching his mother suf-
fer without the benefit of counseling.  Whether the child wants to be removed or
not, it is not always in a child’s best interests to be removed from a dying par-
ent.174
VII.  ADVANCES IN HIV TREATMENT: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
For the first time since the start of the HIV epidemic, there has been a radi-
cal change in the information the public is receiving about HIV.  In the past year,
169. See Cooper, supra note 30, at 77-78.
170. See MCCAHEY ET AL., supra note 4, § 12-5.
171. In the author’s experience, judges seriously consider the wishes of children as young as four
or five.
172. See MCCAHEY ET AL., supra note 4, § 12-5.
173. See supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
174. See MCCAHEY ET AL., supra note 4, §§ 12.5-.9 (discussing the considerations used to evaluate
a child’s decision about guardianship); see generally CLAUDIA L. JEWETT, HELPING CHILDREN COPE
WITH SEPARATION AND LOSS (1982) (providing a guide for parents to help their children through
losses such as divorce and death).
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publicity about HIV has focused primarily on advances in new HIV treatments175
and has contributed to a decrease in the death rates among people with AIDS.176
The evidence clearly shows that people with HIV are living longer and healthier
lives as a result of both these new treatments and advances in prophylactic
treatment of opportunistic infections.177  Although many people with HIV/AIDS
will not benefit from the new treatments,178 there is overall agreement that the
management of HIV disease is improving for most HIV-positive people in the
United States.179
In the face of these positive changes, the renewed sense of hope and opti-
mism in the HIV community cannot be overstated.  HIV is now considered by
many as a “chronic” illness instead of a “terminal” illness.180  It is clear from the
medical progress in treating HIV that the illness is changing; the approaches and
strategies of HIV advocates in these cases also must change.  The new medical
advances potentially will have a positive impact on HIV-related custody, visita-
tion, and foster care cases.  Courts and child protective workers may be less
likely to presume that a parent will become sick and die, and less likely to deny
parents custody on the basis of their HIV status.  HIV advocates also can use the
new information about HIV, coupled with progress in treatment, to lessen the
potential harm of a parent’s HIV status on the children.
While these developments are encouraging for the HIV community as a
whole, the fact remains that the rate of HIV infections and the need for services
continue to increase.181  The advances also have had less of an impact on poor
HIV-positive women, who are most likely to be involved in HIV-related custody,
visitation, and foster care cases.  In addition, while AIDS-related death rates are
175. See, e.g., David W. Dunlap, Hype, Hope and Hurt on the AIDS Front Lines, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2,
1997, § 4, at 3; John Leland, The End of AIDS? The Plague Continues, Especially for the Uninsured, But
New Drugs Offer Hope for Living with HIV, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 2, 1996, at 64.
176. See Kim Painter, AIDS Deaths Drop 13% in First Decline, USA TODAY, Feb. 28, 1997, at 1A;
Oscar Suris, AIDS Deaths Drop Significantly for First Time, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 1997, at B1.  Since the
first reports of a 13% decrease in the death rate, the CDC has reported that the death rate decreased
by 23% from 1995-96.  See Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, supra note 16, at 863.
177. See Jill A. Cadman, Some Relief from the Epidemic, GMHC TREATMENT ISSUES, Mar. 1997, at 1.
178. Some people cannot take the new treatments because of the side effects.  See Andrew Jacobs,
The Diagnosis: H.I.V.-Positive, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1997, at B1 (noting that “[b]etween 10 and 30 per-
cent of those who take the grueling course of new AIDS medications fail to respond”); Joe Nicholson
& Dave Saltonsall, For Some, New AIDS Drugs Only a Cure for Hope, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Feb. 2, 1997, at
News 20.  Many cannot afford the new drugs.  See Robert Pear, Expense Means Many Can’t Get Drugs
for AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1997, at A1.  Others are denied the drugs by doctors who believe their
patients cannot comply with the rigorous treatment schedules.  See Deborah Sontag & Lynda Rich-
ardson, Doctors Withhold HIV Pill Regimen from Some: Failure to Follow Rigid Schedule Court Hurt Oth-
ers, They Fear, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1997, at A1.  The HIV community also recognizes that the long-
term benefits of the new treatments are not known.  See Jacobs, supra, at B1.
179. See Suris, supra note 176, at B1.
180. See Lawrence O. Gostin, Preface: Hospitals, Health Care Professionals, and Persons with AIDS to
AIDS AND THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 3, 3-4 (Lawrence O. Gostin ed., 1990); Jacobs, supra note 178, at
B1.
181. See Julie Makinen Bowles, Positive Strides, Uphill Climb in AIDS Fight, WASH. POST, Sept. 22,
1997, at D1 (reporting that AIDS service organizations’ caseloads “are growing as HIV-positive peo-
ple live longer and seek more services”); Liz Willen, AIDS Overload: City Struggles to Handle Cases,
N.Y. NEWSDAY, Feb. 2, 1997, at A3.
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decreasing, they are doing so at a much slower rate for women.182  Despite the
fact that death rates are decreasing, HIV-positive individuals are still dying pre-
maturely in large numbers,183 and the rate of new HIV infections continues to rise
for women.184  Moreover, the evidence shows that women are diagnosed with
HIV later than men and are less likely to get medical care.185
The impact of these advances on the way in which attorneys will represent
HIV-positive parents in custody and foster care cases is unclear.  In the short
term, the effect is likely to be minimal.  Thus far, HIV social service providers in
high incidence areas have experienced an increase in the number of people
seeking assistance.186  In addition, poor women of color with HIV are less likely
to benefit from the advances.187  Most important, in individual cases where a par-
ent has advanced illness and is suffering from HIV-related symptoms, the many
challenging issues that an HIV advocate faces will be unchanged by the ad-
vances.  For the present, attorneys representing HIV-positive parents in Family
Court must continue to find new and effective ways to deal with the difficult is-
sues raised by these cases.
VIII.  CONCLUSION: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HIV ADVOCATES
One of the first law review articles written on HIV and child custody rec-
ommended guidelines for making HIV-related custody decisions that are no less
relevant ten years later.188  In that article, the commentator suggested that courts
should not deny custody to HIV-infected parents on the basis of their HIV status
alone.189  In determining the best interests of a child whose parent is HIV-
infected, the commentator recommended that
[f]irst, a court should calculate the best interests of the child without reference to
the  parent’s HIV infection; second, it should obtain current information about
the diagnosis, transmissibility, and symptoms of HIV infection; third, it should
solicit a qualified physician’s diagnosis of the parent’s present health and prob-
able life expectancy, based on the clinical symptoms of HIV infection; and, fi-
182. When the CDC initially announced in February 1997 that the death rate for AIDS victims
had gone down, the death rate had actually gone up by 3% for women.  See Cadman, supra note 177,
at 1.  More recently, the CDC announced that while the death rate finally has gone down for
women, it has gone down by only 10%, compared to a 25% reduction in the death rate for men.  See
Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, supra note 16, at 863 tbl.1.
183. HIV infection remains a leading cause of death among persons aged 25-44 years.  See Cen-
ters for Disease Control & Prevention, supra note 16, at 866.  In New York City alone, of the 15,912
individuals diagnosed with AIDS in 1995 and 1996, 3965 (about 25%) had died by March 1997.   See
AIDS SURVEILLANCE UPDATE—NEW YORK CITY, supra note 19, at 3 tbl.3.
184. See Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, supra note 16, at 863 tbl.1 (noting that the
AIDS incidence for women increased by two percent in 1995-1996 while it decreased for men by
eight  percent).
185. See George F. Lemp et al., Survival for Women and Men with AIDS, 166 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES
74, 75-78 (1992) (discussing a study showing a lower survival rate for women than for men with
AIDS).
186. See Bowles supra note 181, at D1; Willen, supra note 181, at A3.
187. See Kathleen A. Ethier et al., For Whose Benefit? Women and AIDS Public Policy, in WOMEN
AND AIDS: COPING AND CARE 207, 221 (Ann O’ Leary & Loretta Sweet Jemmott eds., 1996).
188. See Mahon, supra note 3, at 1138-41.
189. See id. at 1138.
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nally, it should make specific findings as to how the HIV positive parent’s
health affects the best interests of the child.190
While these recommended guidelines remain pertinent, HIV practitioners must
move beyond them based on experience with the HIV epidemic in the past
decade and with an understanding of how cases in Family Court actually are
resolved.
The most significant recommendation in these guidelines encourages judges
to conduct individualized assessments about the impact of the parent’s HIV
status on the children in deciding these cases.  For the HIV advocate, the chal-
lenge is to convince judges not to make decisions based on their initial judgment
about the case, but to make reasoned decisions based on both the facts and the
appropriate legal standard.  As noted above, this effort particularly is challeng-
ing in jurisdictions where judges face overcrowded and stressful courtrooms.191
Another significant recommendation is to present judges with information
about HIV.  Even today, there remains a lack of knowledge and a great deal of
misinformation about HIV.  The guidelines call upon judges to solicit the opinion
of a “qualified physician,”192 presumably the treating doctor if one exists, re-
garding the parent’s health and life expectancy.  Psychological testimony often is
much more critical than medical testimony in these cases.  Doctors rarely are
able to predict a patient’s life expectancy with any accuracy, and they have little
ability to comment on a parent’s physical capacity on a day-to-day basis.  While
medical testimony may be important evidence that a patient’s condition is under
control, and that the parent is complying with recommended treatment, psy-
chological testimony, especially if given by a professional working with the fam-
ily, is more valuable in showing how a parent and children are coping with, and
adapting to, the illness.
It is not realistic to expect judges to calculate the best interests of a child
“without reference” to the person’s HIV status, as the guidelines suggest.193
While this may be possible when an HIV-positive litigant is asymptomatic, the
most difficult cases faced by HIV practitioners are those in which the party is
suffering from HIV-related illnesses.  In such situations, it is impossible to evalu-
ate the case without reference to the individual’s HIV status.  Moreover, in most
cases, even those in which the party is asymptomatic, the parent’s HIV status
does have some impact on the children.
Finally, the guidelines fail to address the issue of substance abuse, which is
a prevalent issue in many of these cases.  Practitioners should be diligent in in-
sisting that judges make individualized assessments and do not simply invoke
subjective feelings based on a parent’s history of substance abuse.
Most important, attorneys must develop systemic strategies to address the
problems raised by HIV-related custody cases.  Unless attorneys can influence
the system as a whole, these cases will continue to be decided based on the sub-
190. Id.
191. See THE FUND FOR MODERN COURTS, supra note 10, at 6, 9 (detailing some of the hurdles that
advocates must overcome in Family Court in New York City).
192. See Mahon, supra note 3, at 1138.
193. Id.  The guidelines do suggest that HIV infection ought to be considered last to ensure that
this factor is not overemphasized.  See id. at 1139.
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jective decisions of the judge who happens to be hearing the case.  First, HIV ad-
vocates should address the ways in which the Family Court process generally
has a harmful impact on HIV-positive litigants.  As discussed above, much of the
damage to HIV litigants in Family Court derives from problems within the sys-
tem as a whole.  As with other issues, such as the delivery of health care services,
the treatment of HIV-positive individuals in the Family Court system demon-
strates how the system does not function properly.  In the case of family law,
HIV advocates can work with other family law advocates to illustrate the harm-
ful impact of limited resources, overcrowded conditions, time delays, and confi-
dentiality breaches on the low-income poor people whom the court primarily
serves.
A second goal for HIV advocates is to ensure that HIV-positive litigants,
where possible, have attorneys who are experienced in working with this popu-
lation.  HIV-positive individuals should have access to attorneys who under-
stand HIV-related medical and psychosocial issues, who are comfortable work-
ing with HIV-positive individuals, and who have access to, and relationships
with, experts in the field.  Judges should be encouraged to refer clients to HIV
experts, and attorneys should ensure that HIV-positive litigants in Family Court
are aware of all potential resources.
A third goal for attorneys who represent HIV-positive individuals is to
work with judges, Family Court administrators, law guardians, and court-
appointed counsel to address HIV-related issues outside of the individual cases.
The potential areas that should be explored include developing policies and pro-
cedures that ensure the confidentiality of HIV-related information, instituting the
training of judges, lawyers, and law guardians on HIV-related discrimination is-
sues, and establishing guidelines for HIV-related cases that recognize the im-
portance of resolving these cases as quickly as possible.  The possible solutions to
these issues, of course, will vary by jurisdiction.
Finally, attorneys need to work with other professionals to develop needed
research and to secure access to expert medical and psychological testimony to
aid judges in deciding HIV-related cases.  Although sufficient evidence exists re-
garding how HIV is transmitted, there has not been enough research, and little
documentation is available, on the impact of parents’ terminal illness on their
children and how such exposure will affect the children in the long term.  By
working closely with psychological experts, attorneys will be able to help de-
velop the psychosocial expertise that judges need to decide these cases fairly,
both for children and their parents.
